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‘Not to depart from Christ’: Augustine between 
‘Manichaean’ and ‘Catholic’ Christianity
The North African Manichaean community provided the setting in which Augustine reaffirmed 
a commitment to Christ and to ‘Christianity’ that he had largely abandoned in the years of his 
secular education, and it cultivated in him a positive relationship to ‘religion’ in addition to 
his personal fondness for ‘philosophy’. In both ways, his time with the Manichaeans formed 
an essential background to his later commitment to the ‘Catholic’ Christian community, and 
he continued to wrestle with that debt through his endeavours to convince Manichaeans that 
the Catholic Church could successfully address their earnest ‘Christian’ spiritual aspirations 
in a way Manichaean doctrine and practice never could.
Introduction
In what follows, I wish to address two ways in which Augustine found himself ‘between’ 
Manichaean and Catholic Christianity, and in that way come to some comparative observations 
about these two religions. Firstly, Augustine passed between Manichaean and Catholic 
Christianity in his apostasy from the first and conversion to the second. Secondly, Augustine 
continued to occupy a fairly unique position between Manichaean and Catholic Christianity in 
his first decade and a half as a ‘Catholic’. Both situations provided a certain kind of dialectic 
within which Augustine defined himself, in which Manichaeism served as far more than merely a 
negative pole. But to grasp the manner in which Manichaeism first shaped Augustine’s religious 
sensibilities, and then continued to elicit responses from him that kept him out of the Catholic 
mainstream, we need to leave behind hagiographical attitudes towards Augustine, whether they 
be theologically motivated, or the product of secular appreciations of his intellectual or rhetorical 
brilliance. With rare exceptions, Augustine was not writing for the ages, but for immediate effect 
on the people around him in North Africa. His concern with Manichaeans after he had left their 
company arose first from his ongoing personal involvement with individuals who remained 
a part of that community, and only secondarily did it entail grappling with Manichaeism as a 
system of belief and practice, either as an extension of that personal involvement, or in the course 
of doing his polemical duty within the Catholic Church.
It is important that we do not treat the Manichaean and Catholic communities with which 
Augustine involved himself as two abstract -isms. Nor should we assume that Augustine had 
familiarity with the full set of attributes we assign to each of these religions from our study of 
all witnesses to them (Lim 1989:231–250). Augustine made his allegiances in a specific, regional 
environment, and in relation to specific individuals or small, immediate circles of people, both as 
a ‘Manichaean’ and as a ‘Catholic’. We need to conceive of his time as a Manichaean in association 
with close friends such as Alypius, Honoratus, Nebridius, Romanianus, the unnamed friend who 
died in Thagaste, as well as in contact with the various anonymous Electi to which he refers 
including, at a critical juncture, the imposing figure of Faustus. Similarly, he found his way to 
Nicene Christianity in the specific and in some ways peculiar conditions of Milan, in relation 
to individuals such as Ambrose, Simplician, and the several socially well-connected individuals 
mentioned in his early literary compositions and correspondence (Brown 2000:69–107). His 
commitment had to survive his departure from this unique environment in Milan and return to 
Africa, where he found it impossible to escape the associations of his Manichaean past.
As a Manichaean, Augustine had already professed a commitment to the one supreme God, to 
Christ the divine revealer and saviour, to Paul the true Apostle, to the (qualified) authority of 
New Testament writings, to an ascetic ethic, and to a conception of the self as an exiled soul 
longing for a return to God. The presence of any of these elements in the writings he composed 
immediately after converting to Nicene Christianity proves nothing in itself about the rapidity 
and depth of his indoctrination into his new faith. Instead, we witness a gradual adaptation 
of these prior symboli imparted to him by a Manichaean Christianity to their meaning within 
a new ideological system, the Nicene-Catholic one. So when he said in The Academics that his 
new commitment to Platonism would not alter his resolve ‘not to depart from Christ’ as an 
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authority (Augustinus, Contra Academicos 3.20.43), Augustine 
signalled a self-understanding by which he had already been 
committed to Christ as a Manichaean – just as was the case with 
such Manichaean spokesmen as Faustus (Augustinus, Contra 
Faustum Manichaeum 20.2), Fortunatus (Augustinus, Contra 
Fortunatum 3), or Felix (Augustinus, Contra Felicem 1.20), all of 
whom claimed for themselves the identity of christianus.
From all of the evidence available to us, Augustine first ‘came 
to Christ’, if we may use that expression, through Manichaeism. 
He had left the faith of his mother so far behind that his 
teacher in Madauros assumed him to be a fellow pagan 
(Augustinus, Epistula 16). This perception simply reflects the 
fact that his interests were more intellectual than religious, 
and that he immersed himself in the nominally pagan 
classics of the Roman literary and intellectual tradition. He 
chose a secular professional career centred on this tradition, 
as a rhetor and teacher, and remained a layperson both as a 
Manichaean and as a Catholic, until forced against his will 
into the priesthood. Of course, by the time that happened, he 
had already ventured into areas that might be characterised 
as the purview of a lay theologian. I wish to outline the steps 
by which this more explicitly religious identity arose, and the 
debt it owed to his experiences as a Manichaean.
Part 1: Augustine passing 
between Manichaean and Catholic 
Christianity
Fired by a desire to adopt a ‘life in philosophy’, the young 
Augustine could find no actual philosophical community to 
join in Carthage. The intellectual environment reflected in 
Cicero was across the sea and four hundred years in the past. 
Apparently, the only group on the Carthaginian scene that 
seemed to Augustine to even remotely approximate such 
a philosophical focus was the Manichaean cell operating 
there. We can understand this choice if we remember what 
was meant by a ‘life in philosophy’ (Hadot 1995). Augustine 
understood philosophy to be a lifestyle, a self-disciplined 
existence that would subjugate the body and its passions 
and prepare the mind for perception of higher realities. The 
Manichaeans had practices of self-cultivation that seemed to 
carry through what he expected of such a life in philosophy 
from his reading. But by joining them, he necessarily 
accepted, alongside of what he regarded as philosophical 
elements, the sort of discourse and practices that we think of 
as ‘religious’.
Exactly where Augustine would have drawn a distinction 
between philosophy and religion at that time remains 
uncertain. Before we dismiss the question as anachronistic, 
we need to consider that Cicero himself recognised such a 
distinction, and could conceive of philosophers belonging to 
very different intellectual outlooks, yet sharing a commitment 
to conventional religious discourse and practice. Besides such 
classical sources, however, Augustine also had familiarity 
with some aspects of late antique philosophy, which 
complicated and in some respects blurred the distinction. 
He seems to have read quite a bit of Pythagorean literature 
(Andresen 1968:77–98; Takeshi 1965:229–239; Solignac 
1958:113–148), reflecting a model of the life in philosophy in 
which confession, prayers, hymn-singing, and fasting might 
all find a place as methods of self-cultivation.
Nor was there anything strange in the members of a 
‘philosophical’ group reading and analysing religious myths, 
as Augustine would have almost immediately discovered 
the Manichaeans doing. He would have brought to this 
experience the intellectual expectation of his culture that 
a ‘myth’, by definition, cloaked rational doctrines under 
symbolic language (Brisson 2004). He patiently awaited 
further initiation into these philosophical truths concealed 
beneath the Manichaean myth, but they never came. They 
did not come, not because such an allegorical decoding was 
reserved for the Elect, to whose ranks he did not succeed in 
advancing (pace Decret 1978:244ff.). Rather, they did not come 
because there was no such philosophical decoding of myth 
in the Manichaean tradition. Whatever we think Mani might 
have intended by his storytelling, the Manichaean tradition 
after him had dogmatised his discourse in a strictly literal 
sense, seeing him as the ‘Great Hermeneut’ who decoded 
prior religious discourse, but whose own words were 
meant in a perfectly plain and literal sense without need of 
further interpretation. Based on Augustine’s later fondness 
for allegorical interpretations of sacred texts, in line with 
the broader hermeneutical assumptions of his culture, the 
Manichaean attitude quite probably suggested to him that 
they were not as ‘philosophical’ as he had initially thought.
We lack the sources to tell us how Augustine’s impression of 
Manichaeism evolved over the decade of his close association 
with its adherents. Just how quickly and how well did 
he become familiar with its full ‘religious’ content? This 
question has been a subject of recent debate.1 We have no 
substantiated reason to think Augustine was deprived of the 
basic texts of Manichaeism just because he was a layperson 
(pace Coyle 2001). Nor was Augustine a typical layperson. He 
was a highly literate person and avid reader; and he refers 
specifically to reading Manichaean works as a Manichaean, 
as Johannes van Oort has demonstrated definitively (Van 
Oort 2008a:441–466, 2008b:113–121). So access to information 
was not a problem.
Yet we must remember that Augustine brought a classical 
education to his reading, and was bound to understand – 
or misunderstand, as the case may be – certain aspects of 
Manichaean doctrine against that background, especially 
in cases where he might easily conflate a Manichaean 
concept with a classical one to which it bore a superficial 
1.On the question of Augustine’s knowledge/engagement with Manichaeism, Joseph 
Ratzinger, in his review of Adam (1967:217–222), takes the position that Augustine 
was not a very engaged Manichaean, while J. Kevin Coyle (2001:43–56) has gone 
so far as to suggest that Augustine actually read very little Manichaean literature. 
The opposite view has been taken above all by Johannes van Oort (1995:289–307), 
who goes so far as to credit Augustine with a comprehensive understanding of 
Manichaeism. Coyle (2001:45) rightly notes that van Oort’s appraisal of Augustine’s 
knowledge of Manichaeism was based on the latter’s work as a whole, and did not 
distinguish between what he had learned as a Manichaean, and what he learned 
later in his polemical engagement. Subsequently, van Oort (2008b:441–466) 
has attempted to meet this objection in ‘The Young Augustine’s Knowledge of 
Manichaeism: An Analysis of the Confessiones and Some Other Relevant Texts.’
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resemblance. At the same time, he had his own peculiar 
interests, which means, for example, that while he was aware 
of Manichaean criticism of the Bible, he apparently paid 
less attention to how Manichaeans used the Bible in more 
positive expositions of their faith. I think this sort of partial 
and selective attention and understanding best explains 
why Augustine, as a Catholic, could be taken by surprise by 
aspects of Manichaeism he had not fully appreciated when 
he had adhered to the system, and why we can see him 
learning more about Manichaeism as he continued to study 
its texts for polemical purposes.2 In this qualified way, then, 
we might embrace the late J. Kevin Coyle’s assertion that 
‘Augustine as a Catholic presbyter and bishop came to learn 
aspects of Manichaeism which had been beyond the reach of 
Augustine the Manichaean Hearer’ (Coyle 2001:56). That is, 
he was re-exposed to certain Manichaean tenets that he had 
neglected in his own time as a Manichaean; he heard things 
differently in the words of Fortunatus, Felix, Secundinus, 
even Faustus, than he had heard them before, and perhaps 
in this way was driven to take up again Manichaean texts 
he had already read as a Hearer, with fresh perspective 
on what he was reading. The question of Augustine’s 
access to information as a Manichaean, therefore, must 
be distinguished from the issue of his accurate intellectual 
grasp of that information. The most telling indication that he 
at times went far astray in his understanding is his report 
of his own attitude of self-exoneration from sin, and lack 
of enthusiasm for confession (Augustinus, Confessionum 
libri XIII 5.10.18), when we know how central this practice 
was for Manichaeism, and how one Manichaean text after 
another stresses responsibility, compunction and craving for 
forgiveness. Due to misconstruals such as this, we should no 
more exaggerate his expertise than we should his ignorance. 
Yet even on this point, it is possible that Augustine came to 
grasp the full import of Manichaean confessional practices 
as a Catholic, and incorporated that new understanding into 
an appeal to them woven into his Confessions – a subject to 
which we will return.
The tension between Augustine’s interest in a life in 
philosophy, and the non-philosophical character of certain 
Manichaean teachings and practices, came to a head in his 
time with the Manichaean bishop Faustus. Faustus in some 
way shocked and disappointed Augustine’s assumptions 
about what he was doing as a Manichaean. That much is clear. 
But recovering the character of that shock, and its possible 
consequences for Augustine, is complicated. I have made an 
attempt to sort out the evidence in two previous publications, 
where I have drawn parallels between the stances taken 
by Faustus and the principles of Academic Scepticism, and 
suggested how his philosophically-motivated disinterest in 
defending core Manichaean doctrines delivered the shock to 
2.To a certain extent, then, I take a position close to that of Ratzinger (1967:222): 
‘Im übrigen sollte man doch auch bedenken, daß Augustin als Manichäer Laie, 
nicht Theologe war, und daß die geistige Arbeit seiner manichäischen Zeit den 
Problemen der rhetorischen Kultur der Spätantike galt, wie die Titel seiner verloren 
Veröffentlichungen aus dieser Periode zeigen. Allem nach hat er sich in der Zeit vor 
der religiösen Krise, die zur Bekehrung führte, mit religiöser Literatur nicht wesentlich 
mehr befaßt, als ein gebildeter Akademiker es auch heute tut, und so dürfte seine 
literarische Kenntnis des Manichäismus verhältnismäßig gering geblieben sein; 
erst in der Zeit der Auseinandersetzung hat er sich etwas mehr damit beschäftigt. 
Insofern ist der vorchristliche Augustin eher durch die Namen Cicero und Vergil als 
durch den namen Mani zu erfassen.’ 
Augustine’s expectations that ultimately led him out of the 
Manichaean community (BeDuhn 2010:106–134, 2009b:1–28). 
Others are not convinced that Faustus’s manner of handling 
questions about Manichaean dogma had its inspiration 
and motivation in an informed philosophical scepticism 
(Van Oort 2011:558–561). Nevertheless, there is sufficient 
consistency between the stance he takes in his public 
discourses, the Capitula, and what Augustine reports of his 
private attitudes amongst fellow Manichaeans in Confessions 
to understand Faustus as adamantly committed to a program 
of winning assent by reason alone, without resort to authority. 
This was the Manichaean program to which Augustine had 
been won over:
I fell among these people for no other reason than that they 
declared that they would put aside all overawing authority, 
and by pure and simple reason would bring to God those who 
were willing to listen to them, and so deliver them from all error. 
(Augustinus, De utilitate credendi 1.2)
For Faustus, this delivery from error and bringing to God 
required only demonstration of the dualistic premise of the 
Manichaean world view, accompanied by those teachings 
directly related to practice and to the formation of moral 
selves. Thus, he neither pursued the program of reason alone 
in defence of every detail of the Manichaean system, nor 
resorted to authority to substantiate parts of the system not 
amenable to rational proofs, but displayed a pragmatic focus 
which coincides with the distinctive character of Academic 
Scepticism amongst the philosophical schools represented in 
the literature of the time. He expressly ridiculed dogmatic 
obsession with trivial questions, and refrained himself from 
insisting upon the certainty of Manichaean teaching in several 
areas (e.g. the nature of Christ’s incarnation [Augustinus, 
Contra Faustum Manichaeum 5.2–3]; the interpolation of 
particular passages into the Bible [Augustinus, Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum 11.1, 18.3, 19.1, 33.1–3]; even the visionary basis 
of Mani’s teachings [Augustinus, Contra Faustum Manichaeum 
32.20]). Evidently, he included Manichaean astronomical and 
astrological teachings in this category of inessentials, and 
declined to engage Augustine on the subject. For Augustine’s 
own passion for astrology and astronomy at the time, of 
course, these were the most interesting and ‘most difficult’ 
questions (O’Laughlin 1992:101–125):
When I raised these points for consideration and discussion 
he refused courteously enough … for he knew that he did not 
know about these matters, and was not ashamed to admit it. … 
This attitude endeared him to me all the more, for the restraint 
of a mind that admits its limitations is more beautiful than the 
beautiful things about which I desired to learn. I found him 
consistent in this approach to all the more difficult and subtle 
questions. (Augustinus, Confessionum libri XIII 5.7.12)
Augustine, for his own strategic narrative reasons, was 
content to identify Faustus’s motives with a Socratean 
modestus and cautus about what he did not know, without 
spoon-feeding his readers the obvious association of Socrates 
with the Academy, which identified him as the ideal sceptic.
In no way do I wish to suggest that Faustus was a philosopher, 
that he had particular expertise in the Fourth Academy 
beyond the derivative references to it in the writings of 
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someone like Cicero, or that he was an adherent of scepticism 
masquerading as a Manichaean. Instead, just as we may say 
that Ambrose and Augustine were Catholics with Platonist 
tendencies, or even ‘Platonist Catholics’, so we may say that 
Faustus was a Manichaean with tendencies toward Academic 
Scepticism, or one who used the Academic Sceptical tradition 
as a resource in service of his adherence to Manichaeism. 
Moreover, just as in the case of the two renowned Catholic 
leaders, so with Faustus, we cannot speak of a pure, unmixed, 
or strict application of philosophical principles from a single 
school, but only of a dominant philosophical conversation 
partner within a very loose field of popular philosophical 
discourse typical of late antiquity.
Augustine’s own serious dalliance with Academic Scepticism 
seems to have occurred only at the end of his time as a 
Manichaean, that is, in the immediate aftermath of the 
time he spent in religious and secular study with Faustus. 
Traditionally, it has been taken as an intellectual reaction to 
the disappointment of Faustus; but this characterisation arises 
from the mistake of considering Augustine’s scepticism as 
an alternative to, and departure from, Manichaeism. In other 
words, the attribution to Augustine of a distinct ‘sceptical 
period’ after his ‘Manichaean period’, and that is constituted 
a reaction to, rather than influence of, Faustus, depends on 
an erroneous understanding of Augustine’s status vis-à-vis 
Manichaeism in the years immediately following his time 
with Faustus (as well as a misapprehension of his reasons 
for leaving Africa). It has since come to be recognised that 
Augustine identifies himself as an adherent of Academic 
Scepticism at the same time he continued to be a Manichaean, 
in Rome and initially in Milan. He had left Africa not in 
order to abandon Manichaeism, but precisely in order 
to be able to maintain his commitment to it at a time of 
persecution (BeDuhn 2009a:85–124). Augustine continued 
to observe Manichaean practices, and persisted in viewing 
Manichaean doctrines as plausible, that is, not demonstrably 
false (Augustinus, Confessionum libri XIII 5.14.25).
Nevertheless, Augustine’s absence from Africa and 
increasingly critical comparison of Manichaean teaching to 
other intellectual alternatives eventually set the stage for his 
passage from the Manichaean community to the Catholic 
one. Despite various frustrations and disappointments with 
Manichaeism, however, he had learned to value a certain 
kind of religious life, and was determined ‘not to depart 
from Christ’ as a figure of authority nurtured in him, if 
not introduced, by Manichaeism. Not that he aspired to 
be anything but a layperson and philosopher. He happily 
continued in his secular career, wrote philosophical treatises 
on metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology, and 
planned a program of self-cultivation not through religious 
disciplines, but through an ascending education in the liberal 
arts. All the same, more than a decade as a Manichaean 
apparently had instilled certain religious reflexes and habits 
in him, such that, when he left the Manichaeans, he adopted 
not just an alternative philosophy – Platonism – but also, as 
complement to it, an alternative religious system – Catholic 
or Nicene. He could now pick up the biblical Psalms and 
wisdom books, as well as the epistles of Paul, with a certain 
degree of appreciation, and through attendance at the 
sermons of Ambrose found at last a proper understanding of 
the need to decode myth – such as the biblical narrative – into 
philosophical truths. In other words, he was able to take up 
the life of a religious man because he had warmed to religion 
as a Manichaean, and found in the Catholic Church of Milan 
a similarly elevated level of intellectual engagement.
But who was this ‘Christ’ to whom he maintained his 
allegiance? He tells us himself, in the works written around 
the time of his conversion, and also in hindsight in Confessions, 
where he retrospectively criticises the inadequacy of his 
understanding of Christ at that time. We note, first, that 
Christ stands in good company, surrounded by other sages 
who excelled in immediate perception of truth: Pythagoras, 
Plato, and Plotinus. Western Manichaeans likewise regarded 
Pythagoras and Plato, along with Hermes Trismegistus, as 
authentic sages of truth. In one sense, Augustine regarded 
Jesus as simply the most accomplished of these figures, 
the one who had most perfectly and directly served as a 
conduit of truth to humanity. Yet there was also the Christ 
who stood for this truth itself, as the ‘Power and Wisdom 
of God’. The characterisation, derived from 1 Corinthians 
1:24, was a favourite amongst the Manichaeans, referring 
to Christ in his transcendental aspect as nous and dynamis; 
and it likewise was Augustine’s favourite way of referring to 
Christ throughout his early post-conversion writings. Above 
all, Augustine understood Christ in the Manichaean sense as 
a revealer, as a being who even in his death and resurrection 
simply communicated certain insights and lessons for others 
to learn. Totally missing from the early Catholic Augustine 
was any sense of Christ’s death as a redemptive work.
Augustine could not simply carry on his philosophical 
pursuits in peace, however. A further step of his 
transformation came with his obligations as a convert to 
Nicene Christianity to employ his rhetorical skills in the 
production of ‘apostate literature’ targeting the Manichaeans. 
This work had the dual effect of furthering his own Catholic 
indoctrination through repetition of key Nicene symboli, 
while at the same time constantly engaging his past, negated 
self as reflected in his still unconverted Manichaean friends. 
Augustine produced several such works alongside of his 
more philosophical compositions, including De moribus, De 
vera religione, Genesis contra manichaeos. We cannot really be 
sure if he would have produced many more of such works 
alongside his more serious philosophical pursuits, just as we 
cannot assume that his forays into scriptural interpretation 
in them necessarily represented the leading edge of an 
envisioned exegetical effort on the massive scale of his later 
career. Augustine might have had his life all planned out at 
this point, but we cannot assume that the plan corresponded 
with what subsequently occurred.
The final stage in Augustine’s shift in circumstances then 
came with his forced ordination, and change of profession. 
His life in philosophy was now largely at an end, and he had 
obligations to recite and expound upon biblical language on 
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a regular basis. At the time of his ordination, he protested 
his completely inadequate preparation for such a task 
(Augustinus, Epistula 21). He was forced to learn on the job, 
and gradually familiarised himself with the Bible, while 
avidly pursuing any exegetical work he could find to guide 
him in applying the allegorical method to translate biblical 
content into maxims and lessons for living, as well as deeper 
philosophical propositions about the ultimate meaning of 
life. This second wave of ‘Catholicisation’, following his 
initial conversion, did not, however, spell the end of his 
engagement with Manichaeism.
Part 2: Augustine standing 
between Manichaean and Catholic 
Christianity
Augustine had two reasons for remaining, despite the 
risks, ‘between’ Manichaean and Catholic Christianity in 
his literary persona as a leader of the Catholic community. 
In the first place, he had friends amongst the Manichaeans, 
for whose conversion he laboured to a remarkable extent. 
His efforts in this regard were neither perfunctory gestures 
nor performances for his Catholic peers. He went out of 
his way to invoke the bonds of friendship and past shared 
experience, as well as to sympathise with certain appealing 
features of Manichaean teaching. None of this would have 
endeared him to the more conservative leaders of the African 
Catholic Church, just as they would have been displeased 
by Augustine’s hints in various places that he continued 
to converse with these ‘heretics’ in private, and not just in 
public debate. The latter more public engagement belongs 
to the second reason Augustine took his stand between 
Manichaean and Catholic Christians: as an informed apostate, 
he possessed a unique vantage from which to challenge and 
resist Manichaeans on the contested ground of ‘Christianity’, 
over which his past and present communities competed. 
Manichaeism occupies a part of Augustine’s rhetorical oeuvre 
comparable to that devoted to the Donatists and Pelagians, 
and well eclipsing that devoted to paganism or Judaism, 
because it represents a rival option of Christian faith – a distinct 
and parallel trajectory of Christian development which itself 
was critical of the ‘semi-Christianity’ of the Catholics.
To understand how Manichaeism positioned itself as an 
alternative, and indeed ‘true’, Christianity, we should think 
in terms of initially distinct ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ trajectories 
of the Christian movement. These two rival forms of 
Christianity were separated at birth, acculturated in different 
environments, each in their own way shaped by and adapted 
to local conditions. In the west, the Christian movement 
entered into a Hellenistic milieu that played a large role in 
defining its modes of expression, the context of assumptions 
within which it would possess meaning, its terminology and 
practices. In the east, the Christian movement developed on 
the basis of different cultural traditions and assumptions, 
producing something quite distinct, which we call 
Manichaeism. Each developed selected features of the shared 
root tradition, and then collided in their differences.
For this reason, Augustine could not just treat Manichaeism 
as a rejected ‘other’, a non-Christian heathenism. He had 
to deal with Manichaeans referencing Christian authorities 
(Jesus, Paul), and Christian themes (evil, world as prison, 
enslavement to sin, soul’s desire for ‘return’ to ‘another 
world’). The Nicene tradition he adopted had partially 
defined itself over against ‘heresies’, including Manichaeism, 
and had made certain contrasting choices – emphasising God 
as creator and providential orderer of the world, free will, et 
cetera. It had downplayed or set aside features of the earlier 
Christian movement that had become too closely associated 
with its rivals, just as those rivals likewise represented 
developments of selected Christian themes.
Augustine originally adopted this developed Nicene set of 
positions in all their contrast to the Manichaeism he had 
abandoned. Then, for motives that he does not expressly 
identify, he gradually appropriated from Manichaeism 
elements of the Christian tradition that the latter emphasised, 
but had been neglected in the Nicene-Catholic tradition. 
While his motives remain uncertain, the context of his 
shift is clear: his ongoing struggle with the Manichaeans of 
North Africa, and his effort to convert them. This continuing 
encounter with Manichaeans brought to Augustine’s 
attention certain elements of the Christian tradition that 
Catholics had previously downplayed: in particular, Paul’s 
witness to the debility of the will, the mind’s struggle against 
the ‘flesh’.
The rise of these elements in Augustine’s thinking has been 
attributed to his personal psychology, a darkening of his view 
of himself and of humanity in general. Alternatively, they 
have been ascribed to a kind of inexorable logic gradually 
working itself out in his thought in isolation from anything 
going on around him. But such psychological or philosophical 
accounts are largely speculative, and will not take us very 
far towards historical conclusions. As a historian, I can fairly 
be accused of fixating on the surface of things, namely a 
historical context in which individuals such as Augustine 
do what they do. And when we look for such a context to 
Augustine’s shift of positions in the 390s CE, we find nothing 
in the Catholic community (or the Donatist community 
that represented the other rival Christian community) that 
could have prompted the direction he took. Nor, I think, 
can we justify giving the credit to the words of Paul himself. 
Augustine had read Paul a number of times, and had always 
found in him precisely what he wanted to. The only ones 
reading Paul the way Augustine came to in the 390s were the 
Manichaeans. Undoubtedly, Augustine had been exposed as 
a Manichaean auditor to some version of this reading of Paul, 
and the related issues of the subjected human will and its 
dependence on grace for liberation. But what he reports of his 
personal understanding as a Manichaean suggests that his 
grasp of these points was somewhat confused. Consequently, 
we find ourselves in the enviable position of being able to 
actually overhear the exchange in which Augustine received 
fresh instruction in just how Manichaeans read Paul on the 
subject of human will and divine grace.
Original Research
http://www.hts.org.za doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1355
Page 6 of 8
At the end of August 392 CE, Fortunatus bludgeoned 
Augustine over the head with Paul, quoting a key set of 
verses from Romans 7, Galatians 5, and Ephesians 2 (see 
Alflatt 1974:113–134, 1975:171–186; Rutzenhöfer 1992:5–72; 
Fredriksen 2010:142–154). Augustine’s vain attempt to force 
a free-will reading on the latter passage tells us all we need 
to know about where Augustine stood at the time as a loyal 
son of the Catholic Church, defending its free will position. 
Yet the way Fortunatus read Paul that day is largely how 
Augustine read Paul five years later, albeit set within a 
radically different metaphysical and theological framework.
In fact, Augustine yielded some ground to Fortunatus’s 
reading of Paul in the immediate aftermath of their debate, 
but only to find a stronger position from which to resist 
Manichaeism. Drawing on sources within his own Nicene-
Catholic tradition, as well as on a few suggestions of the 
Donatist writer Tyconius, he formulated a rather stable, 
well-reasoned conception that explained Paul’s expression of 
disability as due to the power of self-created habit, while at 
the same time anchoring a qualified free-will position around 
the idea of being saved by faith – that is, freely willing to 
throw oneself on the mercy of God to free one’s good will 
from powerlessness amid mortality and ingrained habit. He 
built into this construct an anti-Manichaean defence of the 
value of the Old Testament law as the instrument through 
which God exposes human incapacity to act rightly, and thus 
drives those who will to reliance on faith (see Fredriksen 
2010:155–189).
This set of ideas, developed circa 392–396 CE, was a perfectly 
good answer to Fortunatus and the Manichaeans, sufficiently 
consistent with the established orthodox discourse on these 
subjects, and there was absolutely no reason for Augustine 
to abandon it. But abandon it he did almost immediately. We 
see him rapidly undercut the role of the Old Testament as 
he develops the idea of the congruent call, operating both 
externally in signs and internally in mental admonition, 
so closely resembling the operations of the Manichaean 
Light Nous. We see him disassemble his careful construct 
of salvation by faith, by giving this call an absolute power 
to elect to salvation regardless of the presence or absence of 
any predisposition to good will. We see him constructing, 
largely with reference to the same Pauline passages cited by 
Fortunatus, a very similar concept of salvation by grace, by 
some sort of predetermining election quite similar to what 
Fortunatus and Faustus argued Paul meant in speaking of 
the birth of the New Man, out of a mixed mass of good and 
bad elements in the Old Man that is not really a conscious 
and responsible human being at all. If today Christian 
theologians find in Paul the apostle of grace, it is due to the 
powerful influence of Augustine, the doctor of grace. And 
even though there are distinctive qualities to Augustine’s 
doctrine of grace that have nothing to do with Manichaeism, 
the degree to which he found in Paul a source of such an idea 
derives from his unique position between Manichaean and 
Christian theology. So we can confirm the words of J. Kevin 
Coyle, ‘without Manichaeism, there would still have been 
Augustine, perhaps even Augustine the great theologian; but 
it would have been a different Augustine, with a different 
theology’ (Coyle 2003:22).
At the risk of appearing to be something of a Hegelian, 
I suggest that Augustine in certain respects fashioned a 
historical synthesis out of the two conflicting traditions that 
had successively claimed his allegiance. Few shy away from 
saying as much about his blending of Platonism with Nicene 
Christianity, perhaps because they buy into Augustine’s 
claim that Plato was himself a kind of anticipatory Christian. 
But to say as much of his use of Manichaean concepts 
stirs controversy because of the ‘heretical’ or even ‘non-
Christian’ character of that tradition. I find little use for such 
predetermining boundary drawing. Everyone who came 
after Jesus within the Christian tradition could be fairly 
characterised as a ‘heretic’ of one kind or another, because 
they introduced interpretations that cannot be shown to 
be inherent in the teachings of Jesus himself – Ambrose, 
Athanasius, Origen, Paul himself, are all Christian ‘heretics’ 
in this regard. The question of what may or may not be 
‘Christian’ comes to more or less the same thing. If we are to 
avoid theologically normative assessments of what counts as 
Christian, we must accept a community’s self-definition on 
whether or not they belong to a particular religious tradition.
We can definitively leave behind the portrayal of Mani in the 
Acta Archelai (Hegemonius, Acta Archelai 65.2–6), as someone 
who added to his teachings a veneer of Christian content as 
a last-minute marketing ploy. A Christian impetus can be 
found in Mani’s religion from its inception. But it is a Christian 
impetus received by Mani in a distinctive, Asiatic context – 
and that made all the difference. Just as Augustine found 
concordance between Christ and Plato, so Mani found key 
alignments between Christ and Zoroaster and the Buddha, 
amongst other spiritual forebears. Neither Augustine nor 
Mani considered themselves any less followers of Christ for 
doing so. Just as Augustine did not depart from Christ in 
leaving Manichaeism and becoming a Platonist and Catholic, 
so Mani did not depart from Christ in discerning a universal 
religious message equally revealed by prophets across the 
globe long before Jesus walked – or appeared to walk – upon 
the earth.
I would submit that Augustine, at least through the time 
when he composed Confessions, remained convinced of 
the earnestness of Manichaean aspirations to a spiritual, 
Christian life, however much he had concluded that 
Manichaeism itself did not possess the resources to properly 
nurture such aspirations. As mentioned before, one of 
the things Augustine appears to have gotten wrong in his 
own practice of Manichaean Christianity was his failure to 
internalise its confessional ethos. As a Catholic Christian, he 
often asserted that Manichaean belief in the inherent divinity 
of the soul necessarily precluded any sense of personal 
sinfulness. He reports this same deficiency in his own case in 
the narrative of Confessions. And yet, he seems to have come 
to realise that Manichaeans at least aspired to a confessional 
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attitude, however much their ideology counter-acted it. This 
realisation provides the context for Book 9 of Confessions 
where, as Annemaré Kotzé has convincingly demonstrated, he 
prescribes the biblical Psalms as the antidote to Manichaean 
self-exaltation (Kotzé 2001:119–136). If only they could see 
the effect the Psalms had on him, who once shared – as he 
saw it – their failure to truly confess. His rhetorical argument 
only works if he assumed they genuinely aspired to such a 
confessional orientation to God, if he could offer his ‘Catholic’ 
method as a fulfilment of their ‘Manichaean’ goals.
But even if he prescribed the words of the Old Testament 
as the humbling antidote that would make Manichaeans 
into Catholics, Augustine goes on in Confessions to radically 
qualify even the Bible’s authority in relation to what he 
seems to imagine Manichaeans and Catholics share in 
their common quest in search of truth. The Bible is, for 
Augustine, only a temporary instrument of this search, 
necessitated by the fall into matter and the obscurity of 
language. If acceptance of the Old Testament constitutes one 
of the chief distinctions separating Manichaeans from what 
Faustus describes as the ‘semi-Christianity’ of the Catholics, 
Augustine works to grind down this hurdle in order for the 
Manichaeans to clear it. So, in Books 11–13 of Confessions 
(in Augustinus, Confessionum libri XII), he first demonstrates 
how allegorical interpretation takes away the features of 
the biblical text that offended the Manichaeans. That is, he 
does not defend the literal meaning of the text to which they 
objected, or insist they must withdraw those objections. 
Rather, implicitly treating their objections as valid, he points 
them to another level of meaning – a level that is necessary 
in acknowledgment of the validity of the problems with the 
literal level of meaning. Then, towards the end of Book 13, 
Augustine pointedly identifies the Bible with the ‘firmament’ 
God created in the Genesis story, which at one and the same 
time stabilises human reality in this world while separating 
human beings from direct communion with God. That is why, 
Augustine stresses, God will ‘roll up’ both the firmament of 
the sky and the firmament of the Bible, when he welcomes 
amongst his elect those he has secretly selected, ‘before the 
firmament was made’, both inside and outside the Catholic 
Church. These saved souls – chosen, called, enabled by God 
in a strikingly Manichaean conception of grace – belong to 
an ultimate reality that transcends the authority of the Bible 
and of the Church. Therefore, Augustine appears to imply, 
to temporarily accept the authority of the Catholic Church 
and its full scripture amounts to a trifle, a mere ‘change of 
a few words and sentiments’, that his Manichaean friends 
just might be willing to do for both their immediate and 
ultimate good.3 
Augustine signals through the composition of Confessions that 
he saw himself as uniquely and providentially positioned 
‘between’ Manichaean and Catholic Christianity for just this 
purpose. He would carry on in his efforts for only a few more 
years, however. His hoped-for resolution of the division 
between Manichaean and Catholics – perhaps too creative, 
3.For a full development of this interpretation of Confessions Book 13, see BeDuhn (2013).
abstract, and mystical – failed to materialise in practical terms, 
and many of those he hoped to convert remained resolutely 
within the Manichaean camp. The tone of his anti-Manichaean 
writings became increasingly harsh, his new arguments more 
defensive than inviting. Ultimately, he sanctioned coercive 
measures to bring them into the Catholic Church, with only 
the consolation that, as fellow Christians, forced conversion 
would not require them to ‘depart from Christ’.
Conclusion
In his North African setting in the 4th and 5th centuries 
CE, Augustine very easily could have passed through his 
entire spiritual journey from childhood to death thinking 
of himself as a ‘Christian’, despite peregrinations through 
a largely secular or even pagan schooling and more than a 
decade as a Manichaean. It is preferable to assess the issue of 
religious boundaries at such local or even individual levels, 
rather than to impose artificial definitions of traditions as a 
whole. The debate over whether Manichaeism was a form of 
Christianity (or a Christian ‘heresy’) or its own independent 
religion has continued to burden study of this tradition. 
There are arguments on both sides, shaped respectively by 
different criteria proposed for settling the question. The most 
important fruit of this labour, it seems to me, is to once and 
for all break the habit of talking of Mani and Manichaeans 
as ‘heretics’, and to cease using a comparison to ‘orthodoxy’ 
either to reject their Christian identity or to lay authoritative 
claim over the merits of their distinctive religious vision. 
As a ‘Manichaean’, Augustine learned a wholly plausible 
argument for Manichaean claims on the legacy of Christ; 
and as a ‘Catholic’ he adopted an alternative claim on the 
same legacy, justified by a different but equally plausible 
argument. The Manichaean community was part of a diverse 
Christian movement that, in Augustine’s lifetime, was being 
distilled through normativising processes consolidating 
Catholic dominance. It fell to individual leaders such as 
Augustine to determine what would be included within 
the ‘Catholic’ product of those processes, whether derived 
from within (e.g. Christological positions, traditions of 
biblical exegesis) or without (e.g. Platonic metaphysics) 
the larger Christian movement. Thus, Augustine was in a 
position to make normative judgments that identified some 
aspects of Manichaeism as suitably ‘Christian’ and justified 
appropriating and adapting them for the ‘Catholic’ synthesis, 
while rejecting others as foreign bodies within Christianity 
as he and his colleagues were defining it. It is important 
that we give due attention to this simultaneous boundary-
forming and boundary-crossing activity as an intrinsic 
part of the development of Christianity, and do our part to 
illuminate the ephemeral situatedness of every historical 
attempt to define or control what it means to be ‘Christian’.
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